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INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., a group
of Houston, Texas homeowners filed a common-law nuisance suit to
exclude an apartment building from their neighborhood.1 Plaintiffs
argued that the apartment building would reduce their property

*

Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. Wesleyan University, B.A.; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D.; University of Toronto, L.L.M. A shorter article on related topics
will appear at 43 REAL EST. L.J. 509 (2015).
1. See Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. (Tex. D.
Ct. May 1, 2014), available at https://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/12/Ashby%20
opinion.pdf.
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values by (among other things) increasing traffic and changing their
neighborhood’s character.2 In December 2013, a jury awarded the
plaintiffs damages, and the defendants plan to appeal the verdict.3
The question of whether multi-family housing near single-family
housing may constitute a nuisance is apparently one of first
impression.
If the Loughhead verdict is upheld on appeal, anti-development
activists may seek to raise similar nuisance claims even in cities which
have zoning codes,4 unlike Houston.5 If courts endorse such claims,
apartment buildings throughout the United States could be found to
constitute nuisances whenever litigious neighbors might object.
Part I of this Article describes the background of nuisance law and
the Loughhead litigation. Part II then criticizes the arguments in
favor of the plaintiffs’ claim. Part III suggests that public policies in
favor of walkable infill development and affordable housing support
the rejection of similar claims, and adds that even if neighborhood
concerns should be weighed against these policies, such balancing
should occur during the zoning process, rather than through jury trials
(at least in cities with zoning). Part IV then proposes a rule that
draws a line between appropriate and inappropriate nuisance actions.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF NUISANCE
As noted above, the Loughhead plaintiffs alleged that the
apartments at issue constituted a common-law nuisance because they
would increase nearby traffic and otherwise harm neighborhood
character. This Part explains nuisance law, describes the relevant
facts of Loughhead in more detail, and then discusses the most
relevant case law.

2. See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
3. See Loughhead, No. 2013-2655, at 1; Erin Mulvaney, Jury Awards $1.7 Million
to Residents in Ashby Case, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/
primeproperty/2013/12/jury-sides-with-residents-in-ashby-case/#18972101=0.
4. I note in passing that something permitted by zoning can still be an actionable
nuisance. See 7 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 20.25
(2011) (“A defendant’s compliance with a zoning ordinance may be a factor in
determining whether the conduct is a nuisance, but it is not determinative.”). Thus,
nuisance actions may succeed even in cities with zoning, and even if the defendant’s
conduct complies with zoning.
5. See Amanda Huron, Planning and Politics, in CITIES OF NORTH AMERICA:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN U.S. AND CANADIAN CITIES 208 (Lisa BentonShort ed., 2013) (noting that Houston is the “only major city in the United States
without zoning,” but adding that Houston has numerous other land-use regulations).
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Nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land.”6 Nuisance suits generally involve
allegations that a defendant’s use of its land has caused unreasonable
odor, pollution, or noise.7
At common law, a nuisance exists whenever a person uses his land
in a manner that causes substantial harm to another owner or
possessor of land.8 As industrialization increased the number of
polluting land uses, courts tried to accommodate industry by limiting
Thus, petty
nuisance claims to “unreasonable” land uses.9
annoyances (such as telephone calls10 or an ugly swimming pool11)
may not constitute nuisances.12
More recently, some courts have adopted a “balance of utilities
test,” where a use is found to be “unreasonable unless the utility of
the actor’s conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm.”13 For
example, one Idaho decision adopted this balancing test on the
ground that the state’s “economy depends largely upon the benefits
of agriculture, lumber, mining and industrial development.”14 This
statement suggests that in Idaho, nuisance claims against these
industries will be met with skepticism, as the court will weigh any
harm to nuisance plaintiffs against the economic benefits of such
development.
A. Factual Background of Loughhead
In 2007, Buckhead Investment Partners began plans to build a
mixed-use, twenty-three-story building on a tract of land that had
previously been used for a two-story, sixty-seven-unit apartment

6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
7. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 20.10–.11 (devoting one section of
nuisance discussion to noise pollution alone, and another to gases, smoke, dust,
odors, vibration, and light pollution).
8. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 29.03 (2d ed.
2007). The discussion below relates to private nuisance claims, which involve land
use that injures a private landowner. Id. § 29.01. By contrast, public nuisance claims
(attacking activity that interferes with the rights of the public generally) are beyond
the scope of this discussion. Id.
9. Id. § 29.03.
10. See Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 508–09 (Mo. 1983) (holding that daytime
telephone calls were not a nuisance, despite the fact that they awakened plaintiff).
11. See Fenton v. Longwill, No. 5836, 1987 WL 19559, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5,
1987) (describing a pool as a “minor but distinct annoyance”).
12. SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 29.04[D].
13. Id. § 29.03.
14. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 228 (Idaho 1985).
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complex.15 The land in question was near the Boulevard Oaks
Historic District in Houston, Texas,16 a wealthy historic district with
many single-family houses.17 Neighborhood residents vigorously
opposed the project, primarily because of concerns about traffic.18
Despite such neighborhood opposition, the city could not reject the
project merely due to its alleged incompatibility with the surrounding
neighborhood, because Houston has no zoning code to separate
houses from multifamily dwellings.19
Instead, the city’s Public Works Department denied the developers
a permit to build a driveway on the ground that the project would
create too much traffic.20 The developer then agreed to scale back the
project by eliminating all of the project’s commercial uses and
reducing the number of apartments in the building, among other
things.21 The Public Works Department then granted the permit, but
an appellate panel made up of city employees reversed that decision.22
The developers filed suit, and the city settled the case by agreeing to
grant the permit if the developers reduced the number of stories from
twenty-three to twenty-one and made additional concessions to
reduce traffic.23

15. Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. 1, 11 (Tex. D.
Ct. May 1, 2014) (describing developer’s plans; noting that a prior development had
sixty-seven units; and pointing out that “[a] two story residential development was on
the Property for decades”).
16. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition at ¶¶ 8–10, Loughhead v. Buckhead Inv.
Partners, Inc., (Tex. D. Ct. May 1, 2013), http://stopashbyhighrise.org/site/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/1-Plaintiffs_Original_Petition.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
17. See Historic Preservation Manual, CITY HOUS. PLANNING & DEV. DEP’T,
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/HistoricPres/HistoricPreservationManual/historic
_districts/boulevard_oaks_arch.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (describing houses
and their architectural styles); John Mixon, Four Land Use Vignettes From
Unzoned(?) Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 166 (2010)
(describing Boulevard Oaks and nearby Southampton as “wealthy” residential
areas).
18. See Mixon, supra note 17, at 169 (“Yellow signs opposing the ‘Tower of
Traffic’ sprouted on virtually every yard within a mile of the Ashby site.”). In
addition, some homeowners raised concerns over privacy and shadows from the high
rise. Id.
19. Id. at 169.
20. Id. at 171.
21. Id. (describing developer’s decision to make property solely residential and to
reduce the number of units); see Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 13-26155,
slip op. 2–3 (Tex. D. Ct. May 1, 2014) (describing other measures to mitigate).
22. See Mixon, supra note 17, at 171.
23. See Caroline Evans, “This is Not Over”: Stop Ashby Organizers Vow
Lawsuit, Picket Lines at Packed Strategy Meeting, EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 2012, http://
www.yourhoustonnews.com/bellaire/news/this-is-not-over-stop-ashby-organizers-
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A group of Boulevard Oaks homeowners responded by filing a
nuisance suit against the developers in May 2013.24 The plaintiffs
alleged, among other things, that the building would unreasonably
interfere with their property because it would cause “[diversion of]
traffic onto their small residential streets, and caus[e] substantial
additional congestion at the intersections they use for ingress and
egress.”25 In addition, they claimed that the building “would be
abnormal and out of place in its surroundings thereby altering the
character of the neighborhood [and] would substantially decrease the
value of Plaintiffs’ houses.”26
At a hearing held in June 2013, a trial court decided that the
plaintiffs’ case could go to a jury based on Texas nuisance case law.27
The trial commenced in November 2013, and ended with a jury
verdict in December.28 The jury found a nuisance and awarded
damages to the owners of twenty of the thirty nearby homes.29 The
trial court rejected the defendants’ motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,30 and the developers have appealed.31
B.

Legal Background: No Case Law on Point

In 1926, the Supreme Court, in a decision upholding the
constitutionality of zoning, wrote that apartments intermingled with a
neighborhood of houses “come very near to being nuisances.”32

vow-lawsuit-picket/article_56b626dc-58fe-512b-903a-41854dcc2824.html (describing
settlement).
24. See generally Complaint, supra note 16.
25. Id. ¶ 35. The plaintiffs also claimed that the foundation of the high-rise would
somehow damage the plaintiffs’ foundations, and that the height of the building
would cause invasions of their privacy and reduced sunlight. Id.
26. Id. ¶ 34.
27. See Hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Special Exceptions at 27, Loughhead
v. Buckhead Inv. Partners, Inc., No. 13-26155 (Tex. D. Ct. June 6, 2013), http://stop
ashbyhighrise.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Transcript-06-06-13-Hearing-onDefs-Motion-for-Special-Exceptions.pdf (“I’m going to allow the plaintiff’s [sic]
pleadings to stand . . . . As I read the cases, I agree it appears there is no question but
that I have [discretion to grant either an injunction or damages].”)
28. See Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. at 3 (Tex.
D. Ct. May 1, 2014).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7. The court did not explain in detail why it upheld the jury’s finding,
stating only that the jury relied on unspecified evidence that the plaintiffs’ houses had
lost market value. Id. at 17–18. The court stated, “there is sufficient evidence to
support that finding.” Id. at 7. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ request for an
injunction rather than damages. Id. at 7–11.
31. See Mulvaney, supra note 3.
32. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926).
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However, the Court did not state that apartment buildings were
nuisances, and in any event this statement was dicta because the
decision addressed the constitutionality of zoning rather than a
common law nuisance claim.33
Since then, no case has directly addressed the question of whether
a large apartment building near single-family homes is a nuisance.
However, two nuisance cases involve a somewhat analogous situation:
hotels and motels near single-family homes.
The Loughhead
34
In Spiller, a group of
plaintiffs relied on Spiller v. Lyons.
homeowners alleged that a nearby motel would create a nuisance.35
A Texas appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiffs,
partially because the motel violated restrictive covenants that
burdened the defendant’s land,36 but also because “the increased
traffic would be a danger to children walking to and from nearby
schools . . . and the influx of strangers and transients would be an
offense to normal sensibilities.”37 The court also stated, without any
explanation, that “the present water and sewage services were already
strained and that operation of a motel would further impair those
services.”38
Spiller is not directly on point for the issue at hand because the
motel violated restrictive covenants.39 Moreover, the motel residents
in Spiller would presumably have been more transient than the
apartment residents in Loughhead.40 But some of the arguments
raised by the Spiller court could apply to any apartments near an

33. Id. at 394–95 (upholding zoning that excluded apartments from zones
dominated by detached residences).
34. 737 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1987); see Hearing on Defendant’s Motion for
Special Exceptions, supra note 27, at 9–10.
35. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Plaintiffs also cited numerous other nuisance cases that did not involve
housing or lodging. See Pool v. River Bend Ranch, 346 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App. 2011)
(holding an all-terrain vehicle park a nuisance); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship
v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding a cellular telephone tower a
nuisance); Champion Forest Baptist Church v. Rowe, No. 01-86-654-CV, 1987 WL
5188 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 1987) (upholding the trial court decision that church parking
garage was a nuisance).
39. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30.
40. Compare Von der Heide v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal, 123 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (“[A motel] merely furnishes the transient guest with sleeping
quarters and bath and toilet facilities, with linen service and a place to park his car.”)
(emphasis added), with Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 92 N.Y.S. 851, 852 (N.Y. App.
Term 1905) (“These apartments are rented upon annual leases and transient tenants
are not solicited.”).
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already-settled neighborhood, or indeed to any additional housing in
such areas. Nearly any new residential development will bring
additional residents to a neighborhood, some of whom will be driving
automobiles.41 Thus, the “increased traffic” argument raised by the
Spiller court might make any new apartments (or even houses) a
nuisance if they are near an existing neighborhood. Since new
residents of a neighborhood are by definition “strangers” at first, the
court’s suggestion that “strangers and transients” create a nuisance
might also justify a similar finding as to new housing. And new
residents may also increase the demand for infrastructure, as in the
Spiller case.42
On the other hand, at least one court has rejected a similar claim.
In California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jenkins,43 the
plaintiffs asserted that high-rise hotel-casinos near Lake Tahoe were a
nuisance44 because they would attract “more people and cars”45 to the
area, thus harming the regional environment.46 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, stating, “not every
threatened injury can be enjoined as a potential nuisance. The line is
not a bright one, but we cannot consider high rise hotels and their
occupants as indistinguishable from untreated sewage, noxious gases,
and poisonous pesticides.”47 Thus, California Tahoe suggests that
even hotels (and by implication houses and apartments) are so
different from traditional nuisances that they should generally not be
treated as such.
A nuisance plaintiff might argue that the Spiller court’s decision
that a motel near single-family houses was a nuisance supports a
similar finding as to apartments, because hotels and motels, like
apartments, involve temporary residents. But nuisance case law
involving hotels and motels is divided, and thus does not consistently
support a nuisance claim directed against multifamily housing.
Moreover, no case directly addresses whether new apartments near
single-family housing are a nuisance.

41. Cf. Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
COUNCIL, http://www.nmhc.org/Content.aspx?id=4708 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015)
(noting that seventy-four percent of apartment renters’ households have at least one
vehicle).
42. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30.
43. 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 184.
45. Id. at 193.
46. Id. at 194.
47. Id.
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II. POLICY: ARGUMENTS FOR NUISANCE LIABILITY
In the context of nuisance law, negative externalities are “land uses
that have harmful spillover effects on neighboring property.”48 For
example, when a business dirties the air or water without paying the
costs of cleaning up such pollution, it has imposed an externality upon
everyone negatively affected by such pollution.49 One purpose of
nuisance law is to limit land uses that generate such externalities.50
The Loughhead plaintiffs argued that placing large apartment
buildings near single-family houses would create two major
externalities: (1) increased traffic;51 and (2) intangibly altered
neighborhood character and thus reduced property values.52 For the
reasons stated below, courts should not use these arguments to justify
limiting housing construction near existing development.
A. Increased Traffic
A common argument against new housing (raised not just in
nuisance actions but in many zoning disputes)53 is that such housing
48. Benjamin Harney, The Economics of Exclusionary Zoning and Affordable
Housing, 38 STETSON L. REV. 459, 466 (2009). More broadly, negative externalities
are “costs imposed on a party by the actions of another party that are not borne by
the acting party.” Richard D. Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of
Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Planning: Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W.
VA. L. REV. 839, 843 (1993).
49. Gary & Teague, supra note 48, at 844.
50. See Harney, supra note 48, at 466–67 (“Nuisance disputes generally involve
land uses that generate negative externalities . . . .”).
51. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 21.
52. Id. ¶ 34. The plaintiffs also claimed that the building’s height would reduce
their privacy and sunlight, that the project’s foundation would disrupt the soil of
neighboring properties, and that by destroying nearby trees, the defendants would
reduce neighborhood property values. Id. ¶¶ 27–28, 35. Because these arguments are
highly project-specific and would not necessarily apply to other multifamily
development, I have chosen not to address them below. It does seem to me,
however, that as a general matter building height should not justify nuisance claims
for two reasons. First, it is simply not the case that high-rise buildings generally
reduce sunlight, unless the building is on an extremely narrow street. See Michael
Lewyn, The Sunlight Myth, PLANETIZEN (Apr. 29, 2014, 5:50 PM), http://
www.planetizen.com/node/68573 (showing numerous examples of tall buildings on
sunny streets). Second, a high-rise building will actually result in less visual intrusion
into neighbors’ yards than a house or small apartment building, because just as the
residents of a house 100 feet from a neighbor’s yard can see less than those of a house
ten feet away, the residents of an apartment 100 feet above the yard can see less than
those on lower floors.
53. See, e.g., Watson v. Mayflower Prop., 223 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (upholding zoning limiting density, based on the city’s concerns about traffic
congestion); Storch v. Zoning Bd. of Howard Cnty., 298 A.2d 8, 15 (Md. 1968)
(same); Jeffrey L. Sparks, Land Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private
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would increase traffic. This argument can be used against any new
housing, since any development would add people to a neighborhood
and thus possibly add cars. For example, residents of an existing
subdivision might argue that if a new subdivision is created anywhere
near them, the new residents would use the same roads as the current
residents, creating additional traffic congestion.
This argument should not justify a nuisance action for three
reasons. First, arguments based on traffic have no logical stopping
point. If any increase in population means increased traffic, and
increased traffic means nuisance, then there is no reason why only
homeowners could raise nuisance claims. A commercial landowner
or residential landlord could raise the same complaint, asserting that
nearby housing could clog traffic and thus unreasonably interfere with
the commutes of its employees, tenants, and customers.
Second, if new people mean new traffic, this means that new
housing will add traffic wherever it is located. If new housing does
not add traffic in the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, such housing will be
built elsewhere and add traffic in someone else’s neighborhood.54
Thus, the claim that traffic equals nuisance is a “beggar thy neighbor”
argument—rather than eliminating the externality of traffic, it merely
shifts the externality to another neighborhood and thus does not
reduce society’s total of negative externalities. Moreover, lawsuits
designed to exclude new housing may not even limit traffic in the
plaintiffs’ neighborhood: if restrictions on development keep people
out of neighborhood A and force them to live in neighborhood B
instead, neighborhood B’s cars may drive through neighborhood A,
thus increasing congestion in both neighborhoods.55
Third, to the extent that nuisance suits limit the density of existing
neighborhoods and force new housing into “greenfield” sites—that is,
undeveloped areas, as opposed to places near existing
development56—they may actually increase region-wide automobile
Property Rights Protection Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 211, 232 (2009) (“Zoning that limits
density may relate to transportation and traffic control.”).
54. Cf. Adam Millard-Ball, Phantom Trips, ACCESS MAG., Fall 2014, at 3, http://
www.accessmagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/01/access45-PhantomTrips-revise-links.pdf. Highway engineers’ estimates of how many trips will be
generated by new development are often erroneous because “most trips substitute
for existing ones—they are diverted from existing locations as people change where
they live, work, and shop in the light of new travel options.” Id. at 6.
55. Of course, this is most likely to be the case in certain circumstances: where
neighborhood A has some destination worth visiting, or where drivers can cut
through neighborhood A in order to reach some destination worth visiting.
56. See Anne Marie Pippin, Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield
Redevelopment Makes Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in
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traffic. Greenfield sites tend to be more automobile-dependent than
existing neighborhoods, because they are further from urban cores
that are often the hub of public transit networks.57 Thus, shifting
housing to greenfields would cause the overall amount of automobile
traffic to increase, because some people who might not drive to every
destination if they lived in an existing neighborhood would become
full-time
drivers in an automobile-dependent greenfield
neighborhood. And even if the number of drivers remained constant,
vehicle miles traveled would increase if greenfield sites were further
from shops and other destinations, thus forcing people into longer
commutes.58
In sum, the argument that added traffic is sufficient to make
development a nuisance lacks merit. If added neighborhood traffic
makes development a nuisance, all new housing is a nuisance. But if
all new housing is a nuisance, a successful nuisance claim may merely
displace the nuisance of traffic from a plaintiff’s neighborhood to
another neighborhood.
B.

Neighborhood Character

A nuisance plaintiff might argue that new housing, especially
housing dissimilar to a neighborhood’s existing housing stock, is a
nuisance because it is (in the words of the Loughhead complaint)
“abnormal and out of place in its surroundings,”59 which might, in
some intangible way, make the neighborhood less popular and thus
reduce property values.60 This argument, like arguments based on

the United States and Central and Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589,
596 (2009) (defining greenfields as “pristine, undeveloped land typically located in
low density suburban areas”); Andrea Wortzel, Greening the Inner Cities: Can
Federal Tax Incentives Solve the Brownfields Problem?, 29 URB. LAW. 309, 315
(1997) (defining greenfields as “undeveloped sites in suburban or rural locations”).
57. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1–2.
58. I note that this seems to be the case; neighborhoods far from downtown, in
fact, tend to be further from shops and similar destinations, while downtowns and
nearby areas tend to be within walking distance of more destinations. See, e.g., Jack
Romig, Walk This Way: Close-to-Home Amenities Prove Draw as More People
Leave Their Cars Parked, MORNING CALL (Jan. 3, 2014), http://articles.mcall.com/
2014-01-03/features/mc-walkability-sunday-real-estate--0105-20140103_1_walkabilityeaston-main-street-initiative-valley-community (citing examples); Boise, Idaho,
WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/ID/Boise_City (last visited Apr. 19, 2015)
(illustrating that neighborhoods near downtown are more walkable); Hamilton,
Ontario, WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/CA-ON/Hamilton (last visited
Apr. 19, 2015) (same); Richmond, Virginia, WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/
VA/Richmond (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (same).
59. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 34.
60. Id.
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traffic congestion, has no logical stopping point: any new housing
changes neighborhood character to some extent, and any new housing
might also affect property values by increasing citywide housing
supply.
Like congestion-related arguments against new housing, the
“neighborhood character” argument is essentially another “beggar
thy neighbor” argument: if additional density affects neighborhood
character, it will change the character of a greenfield site just as much
as it changes the character of an existing neighborhood. Indeed, the
effect of new housing upon greenfield sites will be more radical: a
large apartment building will change a cornfield far more drastically
than it will change a neighborhood full of houses or small apartment
buildings. Thus, restrictions upon new housing may merely shift outof-character development from one site to another.
Even if the threat of nuisance suits causes new housing to shift to
an area with a similar housing stock rather than to a greenfield site,
the new housing affects the “receiving” area’s character by increasing
neighborhood population. For example, a neighborhood with ten
apartment buildings will presumably feel busier than a neighborhood
with just five apartment buildings, even if no other housing exists.
Moreover, the public policy in favor of reducing pollution actually
supports changing the character of some areas. In recent decades,
many suburbs and neighborhoods have been built in a way that forces
their residents to drive automobiles in order to reach any conceivable
destination.61 These automobile-dependent neighborhoods generate
both greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of automobileinduced pollution.62 Because pollution has traditionally been a major
concern in nuisance law,63 preserving these places in their current
automobile-dependent form is likely to create nuisance-like harms,
rather than prevent them. By contrast, if infill development changes
neighborhood character by adding housing that is close enough to
public transit stations and bus stops to increase transit ridership, or is
close enough to shops and offices to enable people to walk to these
places, such development actually mitigates the nuisance-like harms
caused by low-density development.64

61. See infra notes 83–96 and accompanying text (contrasting older, more
pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods with newer areas).
62. See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text (explaining that less
automobile-dependent places create less pollution).
63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
64. I note, however, that this argument is not applicable to all infill development:
some infill development does little to increase walkability or access to public transit,
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A nuisance plaintiff’s emphasis on property values should also not
be indulged, because many American communities have been too
successful in bolstering land prices. For example, in San Francisco,
zoning is quite restrictive,65 and residential development is so difficult
that the city has added only 1500 housing units per year for the past
twenty years—fewer than the city’s population gain (32,000 people)
from 2010 to 2013 alone.66 The law of supply and demand suggests
that where a city has artificially constricted supply, housing prices will
be high.67 This is in fact the case in San Francisco. Housing prices in
San Francisco are quite high; the average housing unit costs over
$800,000, more than ten times median household income.68
Out-of-control housing costs caused by constricted housing supply
are not limited to large cities such as San Francisco. For example,
Sausalito, California, a suburb of San Francisco,69 granted between 1.4
and 13.6 permits per 10,000 people yearly since 2000.70 By contrast,
the state average has ranged between 6.4 and 45.3 building permits
per 10,000 people.71 As a result, Sausalito’s median housing unit costs
over $900,000, more than three times the state average ($283,000 in
2012).72
Some commentators argue that homeowners have relied on the
neighborhood status quo, and thus should have veto power over new
development. For example, Bradley Karkkainen argues that when
someone buys a house, he or she intends to purchase not only the
property, but part of the “neighborhood commons”73—not only

either because it is not located near shopping or public transit, or because it is
designed in a way that discourages walking (for example, a subdivision without
sidewalks or with overly wide streets).
65. See Kim-Mai Cutler, How Burrowing Owls Lead to Vomiting Anarchists (or
SF’s Housing Crisis Explained), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 14, 2014), http://tech
crunch.com/2014/04/14/sf-housing/ (describing zoning and planning process in San
Francisco, and how it limits housing supply).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See San Francisco, California, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/
city/San-Francisco-California.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).
69. See Sausalito, California, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/
Sausalito-California.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). Sausalito is a town 7.4 miles
from San Francisco.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. In 2012, the estimated median house or condo value was $928,705. Id. The
mean price of a detached house was $1,100,950. Id.
73. Bradley Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 45, 69 (1994). Although Karkkainen makes this argument in the context of
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community-owned property “such as public schools, public
recreational facilities, and public transportation facilities,”74 but also
“intangible qualities such as neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics, and
the physical environment.”75
According to Karkkainen, changes in a neighborhood’s density or
land use,76 by changing the physical environment, reduce the value of
neighbors’ interest in the “commons” because “the neighborhood is
taking the first step toward becoming something other than the
neighborhood where [the residents] chose to live.”77 In other words,
neighborhood residents purchase homes in reliance on neighborhood
pattern X, and therefore should have veto power over changes that
turn neighborhood X into someplace different.
But this argument may be a self-fulfilling prophecy; when judges
and politicians give people the right to veto nearby development, they
are more likely to expect the status quo to remain, and thus more
likely to rely on it. Homeowners already have this veto power
through zoning codes, since zoning boards and politicians often take
the advice of neighborhood activists.78 Extending this veto power to
nuisance actions would, if anything, increase such reliance.
Accordingly, courts should reject this argument.
In sum, courts should reject nuisance plaintiffs’ arguments that any
new housing that might affect neighborhood character or property
values should justify liability, because this argument is a “beggar thy
neighbor” argument: if development is kept out of a neighborhood, it
shifts to another area and changes the character of that place.
Moreover, the public interest favors more housing rather than less,
especially in expensive regions where limited housing supply has
made housing overwhelmingly expensive.

zoning, it seems to me that this argument could also be used to justify nuisance
actions.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 73 (stating that “changes in density, as well as shifts from residential to
commercial or industrial uses” are “disruptive of a neighborhood’s character because
they are inconsistent with current uses of the neighborhood commons”).
77. Id. at 72–73.
78. See Greg Greenway, Getting the Green Light for Senate Bill 375: Public
Engagement for Climate-Friendly Land Use in California, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
433, 442 (2010) (arguing that infill development is not as common as professional
planners would like because when one landowner proposes such development, other
neighborhood “residents frequently organize to oppose such development”);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, 62
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 84–85 (2012).
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III. POLICY: ARGUMENTS AGAINST NUISANCE LIABILITY
To the extent that concerns over property values, neighborhood
character, and increased traffic justify nuisance claims related to new
housing, these concerns are outweighed by three major policies: (1)
the public policy in favor of pedestrian-friendly “infill” development,
(2) the public policy in favor of affordable rental housing, and (3) the
public policy in favor of orderly zoning and planning.
A. Infill Development, Walkability, and Transit
Because most urban land is zoned for single-family housing,
virtually all of urban America (except in the most densely populated
cities) is near a group of single-family houses such as those owned by
the Loughhead plaintiffs. In Houston, single-family housing takes up
sixty-seven percent of all land and ninety-five percent of all land used
for housing.79 One survey of ten cities shows that Houston is only the
sixth most house-dominated city out of those ten surveyed; even in
Baltimore (the least house-dominated city surveyed), forty-nine
percent of all land and seventy percent of residential land is used for
houses.80 Even a brief look at Baltimore streets will reveal that multifamily and commercial land is often concentrated on a few major
streets, and that those streets are surrounded by streets full of singlefamily homes.81 It logically follows that if apartments near singlefamily homes were a nuisance, almost every new apartment building
in the United States would be a nuisance. If apartments could be
built at all, they could only be built in “greenfield” locations—that is,
in exurban places far from existing development.
But public policy favors building housing in existing urban
neighborhoods and inner suburbs, rather than in greenfields, for two
reasons. First, because existing neighborhoods tend to be more
pedestrian-friendly than greenfield sites, development in existing
neighborhoods (commonly referred to as “infill”)82 increases the

79. See GORDON BONAN, ECOLOGICAL CLIMATOLOGY, ch. 14, at 24 (2002),

available at http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/tss/aboutus/staff/bonan/ecoclim/1sted/Chapter
14.pdf (reporting that sixty-seven percent of city land was used by single-family
homes, three percent by multifamily housing, and thirty percent by commercial and
industrial space).
80. Id.
81. See generally GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com. To see individual
streets look at Baltimore, Md. and click on the “Street View” icon.
82. Cf. Morgan E. Rog, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use,
and the Environment, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 717 (2010) (contrasting
infill development with “outward expansion” of cities).

YES TO INFILL

2015]

855

number of people who can walk to jobs, shops, and other
destinations. Second, because existing neighborhoods are more likely
to be well served by public transit than greenfield sites, infill increases
the number of people who can use public transit rather than driving.
In turn, increased walking and transit use creates a variety of public
benefits: people living in walkable, transit-oriented infill
neighborhoods benefit because they can get more exercise and spend
less money on automobile-related costs, and the public as a whole
benefits from reduced automobile-related pollution.

1.

Walkability and Infill

For a variety of reasons explained below,83 older, more urban areas
tend to be more walkable (that is, more comfortable for pedestrians)
than greenfield sites. Such walkable places create a variety of
benefits both for their residents and for the public as a whole,
including reduced obesity, reduced transportation costs, reduced
pollution, and reduced harm from car crashes.

a.

Why Infill Is Usually More Walkable

Older neighborhoods (especially those built before automobile
ownership became nearly universal) are more likely than greenfield
sites to be designed around the needs of the pedestrian,84 rather than
being designed solely for the benefit of motorists. For example, older
neighborhoods are more likely to have sidewalks, thus allowing
pedestrians to walk without having to dodge speeding traffic
throughout their walk.85 Furthermore, older neighborhoods also tend
to have narrower streets.86 Narrow streets are more convenient for

83. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
84. I do not discuss bicyclists separately because many of the points below apply
to bicyclists as well. For example, if a speeding motorist on a wide street is less likely
to notice a pedestrian in time to avoid an accident, such a motorist is less likely to
notice a bicyclist as well. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
85. See Robert Puentes, First Suburbs in the Northeast and Midwest: Assets,
Challenges, and Opportunities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1469, 1471 (2002) (noting that
older suburbs were “built when sidewalks were the rule, not the exception”); Gabor
Zovanyi, The Role of Initial Smart-Growth Legislation in Advancing the Tenets of
Smart Growth, 39 URB. LAW. 371, 383 (2007) (“[W]ritings that list common features
of older neighborhoods refer to . . . streets lined with trees and sidewalks.”).
86. See John M. Barry, Form-Based Codes: Measured Success Through Both
Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 307 (2008)
(pointing out that “narrow streets” are one of several “central features of older cities
that have largely disappeared”); Zovanyi, supra note 85, at 383 (noting that “narrow
streets” are a common feature of older areas).
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pedestrians because they take less time to cross than wider streets.87
In addition, narrower streets are safer for pedestrians than are wide
streets, because the more time a pedestrian spends on a street, the
more time he or she is exposed to vehicle traffic.88 Wide streets also
tend to encourage motorists to drive more rapidly,89 thus increasing
the likelihood of pedestrian/automobile collisions. A speeding
motorist has a narrower field of vision than one driving slowly, and is
thus less likely to notice a pedestrian.90 Moreover, a speeding
motorist who does notice a pedestrian is less likely to be able to stop
in time to avoid a collision than a motorist who is driving more
slowly.91 And when collisions do occur, they are more likely to be
fatal at rapid speeds: a non-motorist has a 3.5% chance of death from
a car traveling fifteen miles per hour, and an 83% chance of death
from a vehicle traveling forty-four miles per hour.92
Older neighborhoods also tend to have shorter blocks than newer
areas.93 Where blocks are shorter and intersections more common,
pedestrians have more opportunities to cross streets without crossing
midblock or going out of their way to reach an intersection, and thus
can reach destinations more quickly.94
The oldest, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods are also more likely
to have streets that are arranged in an interconnected grid, rather
than the cul-de-sac, dead-end streets that dominate most late
twentieth-century suburbs.95 A grid system is more comfortable for
87. See Donavan v. Jones, 658 So. 2d 755, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
88. See Wallace Immen, City Seeks Solution to Commute Crunch, GLOBE &
MAIL, Apr. 26, 2002, at A22 (pointing out that in downtown Toronto, pedestrians
“have to run to beat the changing light” on wide streets).
89. See Stephen H. Burrington, Restoring the Rule of Law and Respect for
Communities in Transportation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 691, 700 (1996) (arguing that
“solicitude toward fast traffic” motivates government to build wide streets).
90. Id. at 704 n.50 (noting that a motorist driving thirty miles per hour has a 150degree field of vision, while one driving twice that speed has only a fifty-degree field
of vision).
91. See Joey Ledford, Speeding Cars Terrify Neighborhoods, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 27, 1997, at B (“At 20 mph, it takes you 20 feet to react and another 20
feet to stop. At 40 mph, it’s 40 feet to think and another 80 feet to stop.”).
92. See Burrington, supra note 89, at 704.
93. See Barry, supra note 86, at 307 (describing “short blocks” as another “central
feature of older cities”).
94. See Jeff Gray, Police Blaming Accident Victims, Pedestrian Says, GLOBE &
MAIL, Mar. 15, 2004, at A8 (stating that suburban Toronto is “trouble for
pedestrians” because of “long blocks that provide so few safe opportunities [for
pedestrians to cross streets]”).
95. See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented

Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and
Urban Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 556 (1998).
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pedestrians because where residential cul-de-sacs do not connect with
other cul-de-sacs, pedestrians must go out of their way to travel from
one residential street to another.96
In theory, a greenfield building or subdivision could be remade to
resemble older city neighborhoods, with sidewalks and a grid of short,
narrow streets. But, such a neighborhood might be very automobiledependent if its residents had no worthwhile destinations within
walking distance. Because this is often the case for greenfield sites far
from regional downtowns, places near built-out urban cores are, as a
practical matter, the most walkable.97
Admittedly, a few developers of greenfield sites have solved this
problem by building not just residences on pedestrian-oriented
streets, but shops and offices near the residences.98 But, such largescale greenfield development requires a considerable amount of
capital, because the developer must either build hundreds of
residences to create demand for the nearby shops,99 or be lucky
enough to find a site that is accessible to residents of other
neighborhoods.100 However, any site that is close enough to nearby
neighborhoods to attract customers may be close enough to attract a
nuisance action. So, if courts hold that new housing creates a
nuisance merely by its proximity to an existing neighborhood, the
most walkable neighborhoods are likely to be nuisances even if they
are on greenfield sites.

96. See Michael Southworth & Eran Ben-Joseph, Reconsidering the Cul-de-Sac,
ACCESS MAG., Spring 2004, at 28, 29–30 (explaining that a pedestrian “must always
leave the cul-de-sac via a collector street to go anywhere” and showing a diagram of a
cul-de-sac in which pedestrians cannot reach parallel streets).
97. See supra note 58.
98. See, e.g., LANCE JAY BROWN ET AL., URBAN DESIGN FOR AN URBAN
CENTURY: SHAPING MORE LIVABLE, EQUITABLE, AND RESILIENT CITIES 155 (2d ed.
2014) (describing Kentlands in suburban Washington as a “greenfield suburban
development” that was designed “along the lines of a traditional urban neighborhood
[because among other things, it] substituted a street grid for conventional cul-desacs”); AARON PASSELL, BUILDING THE NEW URBANISM: PLACES, PROFESSIONS, AND
PROFITS IN THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE 7–8 (2012) (describing a mix
of uses in Kentlands).
99. See Hazel Borys, Retail On My Mind, PLACEMAKERS (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:01
AM) http://www.placemakers.com/2012/02/20/retail-on-my-mind/ (referring to the
common rule of thumb that one thousand housing units is usually necessary to
support a neighborhood corner store, unless it can attract visitors from outside
neighborhoods).
100. Id. (stating the “1000 rooftop” rule is less likely to be relevant if a store “is
located along a busy road, or if there is an employment center or civic use nearby that
attracts shoppers beyond the neighborhood”).
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Why the Public Interest Favors Walkability

When infill development increases the number of people who can
walk to various destinations, the public benefits in several respects.
First, people who live in walkable communities are likely to be
healthier, because someone who has more opportunity to walk is, all
else being equal, more likely to engage in physical activity and thus
less likely to be overweight or obese.101 The U.S. Surgeon General
advises that thirty minutes of walking for five days a week will reduce
the risks of obesity and weight related problems102—a goal more likely
to be met in areas that are comfortable for pedestrians. For example,
one Australian study found that after controlling for socio-economic
factors such as income and education, “individuals living in high
compared to less walkable areas were not as likely to be obese.”103
Similarly, a survey of New York City residents asked a sample of New
Yorkers how frequently they walked or cycled ten blocks or more,
and found that as walkability increased, so did the likelihood of such
exercise.104
Second, people drive less where they have the opportunity to
walk—and where people drive less, they are, all else being equal,
more prosperous because they spend less on transportation. For
example, residents of Portland, Oregon, drive twenty percent less
than residents of the average metropolitan area, and thus collectively
save $1.1 billion per year.105 Similarly, residents of the city of
Washington, D.C., spend $9461 per household on transportation
annually, while the average household in Washington’s outer suburbs

101. See Vanessa Russell-Evans & Carl S. Hacker, Expanding Waistlines and
Expanding Cities: Urban Sprawl and its Impact on Obesity, How the Adoption of
Smart Growth Statutes Can Help Build Healthier and More Active Communities, 29
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 75–88 (2011) (summarizing evidence); Reid Ewing et. al.,
Relationship Between Urban Sprawl and Physical Activity, Obesity and Morbidity —
Update and Refinement, 26 HEALTH & PLACE 118 (2014).
102. See MEGAN LEHMAN ET AL., INST. FOR PUB. ADMIN., HEALTHY & WALKABLE
COMMUNITIES 3 (2007), http://www.ipa.udel.edu/publications/HealthyWalkable.pdf.
103. See Falk Müller-Riemenschneider et al., Neighborhood Walkability and
Cardiometabolic Risk Factors in Australian Adults: An Observational Study, 13
BMC PUB. HEALTH 755 (2013), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/14712458/13/755.
104. See Lance Freeman et al., Neighborhood Walkability and Active Travel
(Walking and Cycling) in New York City, 90(4) J. URB. HEALTH 575, 580 (2013),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3732693/pdf/11524_2012_
Article_9758.pdf (finding “inverse association between [neighborhood] walkability
and reporting no episodes of active travel”).
105. See JEFF SPECK, WALKABLE CITY: HOW DOWNTOWN CAN SAVE AMERICA
ONE STEP AT A TIME 29 (2012).
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spends $15,601 per household, and some suburbs have even higher
transportation costs.106
Third, if more Americans are allowed to live in neighborhoods
where they can reach a wide variety of destinations without driving,
they will create less automobile-related pollution than would
otherwise be the case. According to one study, sponsored by the
Urban Land Institute, more compact, walkable development could
reduce vehicle miles traveled by twenty to forty percent, which in turn
would reduce total transportation-related carbon dioxide emissions
by seven to ten percent by 2050.107
Environmental benefits from walkable development are not
limited to greenhouse gases. One study by several scholars, sought to
quantify the benefits of reduced driving by replacing half of all short
car trips in the eleven largest Midwestern regions with bicycle trips,
thus reducing regional vehicle miles by ten percent.108 The study
found that reducing short car trips would reduce particulate matter109
pollution enough to lead to 525 fewer pollution-related deaths and
thousands of fewer hospital admissions, thus creating a societal
savings of just over $4.2 billion per year.110
Fourth, walkable communities tend to be safer, because where
people can drive less frequently, they are less likely to injure
themselves and others with their vehicles. The automobile-oriented

106. See URBAN LAND INST., BELTWAY BURDEN: THE COMBINED COST OF
HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE GREATER WASHINGTON, DC,
METROPOLITAN AREA 4–5 (2009), available at http://commerce.uli.org/misc/Beltway
Burden.pdf (listing costs for various jurisdictions, and adding that the most expensive
suburb is Fauquier County, Virginia, where an average transportation cost of $17,996
makes the combined cost of housing and transportation more than twenty-five
percent more than the region’s central jurisdictions); cf. URBAN LAND INST., BAY
AREA BURDEN 6–7 (2009), available at http://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
Bay-Area-Burden-1026-LowRes2.pdf (showing similar results for metropolitan San
Francisco cities and suburbs, despite the region’s higher housing costs).
107. REID EWING ET AL., URBAN LAND INST., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE
ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2007), available at
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/growingcoolerCH1.pdf.
108. See Maggie L. Grabow et al., Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health
Benefits from Reduced Car Travel in the Midwestern United States, 120 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 68, (Jan. 2012) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3261937/.
109. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that particulate matter “refers to all solid particles and liquid droplets
found in air” and is “associated with a range of adverse health effects such as
coughing, shortness of breath, aggravation of existing respiratory conditions like
asthma and chronic bronchitis, increased susceptibility to respiratory infections and
heightened risk of premature death”).
110. See Grabow et al., supra note 108, at 72–73.
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United States has traffic fatality rates far higher than those of
European nations with less automobile dependence, and within the
United States the most automobile-oriented places have the highest
automobile fatality rates.111 The seven metropolitan areas with the
highest share of commuters walking to work were New York, Boston,
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Washington; in
these regions, between 3.5% and 5.9% of commuters walked to
work.112 Six of the seven (all but Pittsburgh) had motor vehicle crash
death rates below the average for metropolitan areas, and even
Pittsburgh’s death rate was below the average for the United States as
a whole.113 By contrast, the metropolitan areas with the lowest
percentage of pedestrian commuters were Birmingham, Dallas,
Nashville, Orlando, Raleigh, and Richmond, with Atlanta and
Louisville tied for seventh; in these regions, between 1% and 1.3% of
commuters walked to work.114 All seven had traffic death rates higher
than that of Pittsburgh (and thus of the average metropolitan area).115
Residents of walkable communities create a wide variety of
benefits for themselves and for the public, including exercise-related
health benefits, reduced spending on transportation, reduced
pollution, and fewer deaths and injuries from car crashes. It follows
that if nuisance suits are allowed to reduce the amount of infill
development, and if such development would otherwise often occur
in walkable areas, Americans will exercise less, spend more on
transportation, pollute more, and be more likely to die in car crashes.

111. See SPECK, supra note 105, at 45.
112. See Wendell Cox, Major Metropolitan Commuting Trends: 2000–2010, NEW
GEOGRAPHY (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.newgeography.com/content/002500-majormetropolitan-commuting-trends-2000-2010. I am not counting Rochester, New York,
(which actually ranked ahead of two of these cities) because I have not found its
traffic death statistics.
113. See Scott R. Kegler et al., Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths in Metropolitan
Areas—United States, 2009, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 20, 2012, at
523, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6128.pdf. The metropolitan
area average was 8.2 deaths per 100,000 people, and the national average was 11.1
deaths per 100,000 people. Id. at 524. Death rates per 100,000 people for each
metropolitan area were as follows: Boston 5.0, New York 5.1, Philadelphia 7.3,
Pittsburgh 9.2, San Francisco 5.6, Seattle 5.9, and Washington 7.5. Id. at 524–26
114. See Cox, supra note 112.
115. See Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (reporting the following fatality
rates per 100,000 people: Atlanta 10.7, Birmingham 15.3, Dallas 9.8, Louisville 11.8,
Nashville 13.0, Orlando 11.3, Raleigh 9.6, and Richmond 11.5).
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Infill and Transit

Just as infill development increases walking, such development also
increases public transit use, creating the same kinds of public benefits
that are created by walkable neighborhoods.

a.

More Infill Means More Transit

There are two reasons why residents of older areas can typically
use public transit more easily than residents of greenfield sites. First,
transit networks have historically been centered near downtown
business districts,116 so neighborhoods near downtowns (which tend to
be older)117 tend to have the most convenient transit service and the
highest transit ridership.118 Second, compact areas tend to have
higher transit ridership than thinly populated places; if only a few
houses can be built on a block near public transit, only a few houses
can access such transit.119 Neighborhoods near downtown tend to be
more compact, and thus can support more transit service.120

116. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF POSTURBAN AMERICA 10 (2006) (explaining that, historically, transit lines converged
downtown, and as the number of automobiles increased, “the prospects for
downtown-centered public transit worsened”).
117. See, e.g., Bill Lewis, Infill Construction Boosts Older Neighborhoods,
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.tennessean.com/story/money/real-estate/
2014/09/25/infill-construction-boosts-older-neighborhoods/16215821/
(identifying
Nashville’s “older neighborhoods” with the “heart of the city”).
118. See Brian D. Taylor & Camille N.Y. Fink, The Factors Influencing Transit
Ridership: A Review and Analysis of the Ridership Literature 7–8, 10 (UCLA Dep’t
of Urban Planning, Working Paper 2003), available at http://www.uctc.net/papers/
681.pdf (citing studies showing that downtown district “employment explains a very
high percentage . . . of the number of transit commuters,” and that the size of
downtown districts is one factor affecting ridership).
119. See ANTHONY DOWNS, STILL STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK HOUR
TRAFFIC 210 (2004) (noting that seven housing units per acre supports bus service
once every half-hour); JED KOLKO, MAKING THE MOST OF TRANSIT: DENSITY,
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, AND RIDERSHIP AROUND NEW STATIONS 16 (2011),
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211JKR.pdf (“[T]ransit
ridership falls considerably at distances beyond just one quarter-mile from a transit
station.”); Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas

Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental
Quality Act with the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71,
80 n.44 (2009) (explaining that raising average density to nine units per acre could
reduce vehicle miles traveled by thirty percent nationwide); John Keitz, Public
Transit: All About Density, NUMBERS BOX (Nov. 9 2014, 3:00 PM), http://numbers
box.blogspot.com/2014/11/public-transit-all-about-density.html. (showing that metro
areas with the highest population density tend to have the highest transit ridership).
120. See KOLKO, supra note 119, at 8 (“[T]he density of both population and
employment typically declines with increasing distance from downtown.”).
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It follows that if new housing is built in existing neighborhoods
(especially compact neighborhoods near regional downtowns), the
residents of such housing will be able to walk, bike, and use public
transit more frequently than would be the case if new housing were
confined to greenfield sites.

b.

Housing Near Transit Benefits the Public

The public benefits from increased housing supply near public
transit for the same reasons that the public benefits from increased
housing supply in walkable neighborhoods generally.
For example, just as residents of walkable neighborhoods are more
likely to be able to exercise in the course of their daily routine and
thus to experience better health, residents of neighborhoods near
public transit can do the same. According to a federal household
travel survey, users of transit spent a median of nineteen minutes
walking to and from transit stops.121 Thus, many transit users may be
able to meet (or almost meet) the Surgeon General’s
recommendations even without other exercise.
Similarly, just as the residents of walkable areas benefit financially
by being able to spend less money on automobiles, people who live
near public transit will also be able to drive less and thus spend less
on automobiles. As noted above, residents of central cities, which
tend to have higher transit use than suburbs,122 tend to spend less on
transportation than residents of automobile-dependent suburbs.123
And just as residents of pedestrian-oriented neighborhoods pollute
less, residents of transit-oriented places drive less and thus pollute
less.
Harvard economist Edward Glaeser and University of
California, Los Angeles economist Matthew Kahn conducted a study
finding that the most transit-oriented places emitted fewer
greenhouse gases than most automobile-dependent places.
In
particular, New York City, the region with the highest use of public
transit, had the lowest level of automobile-related carbon dioxide
emissions from driving among sixty-six regions surveyed.124 The four
121. See Freeman et al., supra note 104, at 582.
122. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon
Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14238, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14238.pdf.
123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
124. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra note 122, at 42. Even when public transit-related
carbon dioxide emissions are added to this figure, New York’s per-household
emissions level of 24,467 was below the national median for driving-related emissions
alone (26,744). Id.
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other regions where over ten percent of commuters used public
transit (Washington, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco-Oakland)125
had emissions levels higher than those of New York, but lower than
the national median.126 By contrast, among the six regions surveyed
where one percent or fewer of commuters used public transit, all had
automobile-related carbon dioxide emissions higher than the national
median.127 Moreover, cities (where transit usage tends to be higher)128
consistently created less carbon dioxide than suburbs: in each of the
sixty-six cities surveyed, transportation-related carbon dioxide
emissions (including both emissions from automobiles and emissions
from transit) were higher in suburbs than in cities. For example, in
New York, the city’s per-household transportation emissions were
3783 pounds fewer than those of the suburbs.129
Finally, residents of transit-friendly places, like residents of
pedestrian-friendly places, also experience fewer deaths from car
crashes than residents of automobile-dependent areas. In the six
regions where transit use is highest, car crash deaths were below the
metropolitan area average.130 By contrast, in the seven regions where
transit use is lowest, crash death rates were either higher than or (in
the case of Indianapolis) equal to the metropolitan area average.131

125. See Cox, supra note 112.
126. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra note 122, at 41. The most-polluting region of the
five, Washington, emitted 25,918 pounds of automobile-related carbon dioxide per
household; twenty-eight of the sixty-six metropolitan areas created less pollution. Id.
127. See id. The lowest-emission city of this group, Memphis, produced more
automobile-related emissions (28,440 pounds of carbon dioxide per household) than
all but sixteen of the sixty-six cities surveyed. Id. The other five regions were Raleigh
(29,922), Indianapolis (29,222), Birmingham (30,041), Nashville (30,495), and
Oklahoma City (28,953). Id. Glaeser and Kahn did not include statistics for
Jacksonville, a seventh major metropolitan area where only 1 percent of commuters
used transit to get to work. See Cox, supra note 112.
128. In every single region surveyed by Glaeser and Khan, public transit produced
more carbon dioxide emissions in cities than in suburbs. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra
note 122, at 41–44. But in not one of those regions did the increased transit emissions
from cities equal the increased vehicle emissions from suburbs. See id.
129. Id.
130. These regions are New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, San FranciscoOakland, and Washington. See Cox, supra note 112. For vehicle fatality statistics, see
Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (providing statistics for each city except
Boston). Chicago’s regional death rate of 5.9 per 100,000 is below the metropolitan
area average of 8.2. See id.
131. These regions are Birmingham, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Memphis,
Nashville, Raleigh, and Oklahoma City. See Cox, supra note 112. For vehicle fatality
statistics, see Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (providing death rates for
Indianapolis (8.2, which was identical to metropolitan area average), Raleigh (9.6),
Birmingham (15.3), Jacksonville (13.3), Memphis (17.8), Nashville (13.0), Raleigh
(9.6), and Oklahoma City (11.6)).
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Thus, a resident of a place with above-average public transit is
likely to spend less on transportation, create less pollution, get more
exercise, and be victimized by fewer car crashes than a resident of an
automobile-dependent area. It follows that housing in such places
should be encouraged rather than discouraged.
Moreover, if more housing should be built in compact urban areas,
it is precisely the sort of housing targeted in Loughhead—compact,
large-scale multifamily housing. As noted above, places with high
population density tend to have higher transit ridership than places
with low population density.132 All else being equal, multi-family
housing is likely to have more people per building than single-family
housing, which means that neighborhoods with multi-family dwellings
tend to have higher transit ridership and to drive less than
neighborhoods dominated by single-family homes.133 Thus, a city that
wishes to reduce automobile-related pollution should seek to
encourage (or at least allow) multi-family housing in areas near public
transit.134 It follows that a state wishing to encourage transit ridership
should restrict lawsuits designed to exclude multi-family housing from
existing in compact neighborhoods.
B.

The Public Interest Favors More Rental Housing

Throughout the United States, there is a rental housing shortage.
This shortage has been caused by increased demand for rental
property; the post-2008 economic downturn has meant that fewer
renters can afford to purchase houses, while tighter credit standards
have forced would-be homebuyers to rent.135 Moreover, the supply of
rental housing has not kept up with demand. Although the number
of multi-family housing starts in 2013 was higher than it was at the
start of the economic downturn, it was still less than half the number

132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
133. This need not always be the case. For example, if the multifamily building has
a huge parking lot that takes up more land than the building itself, it may actually
have fewer households than a block filled with single-family buildings with small
driveways.
134. Cf. Amanda Siek, Smart Cities: A Detailed Look at Land Use Planning

Techniques That are Aimed at Promoting Both Energy and Environmental
Conservation, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 45, 54 (2002) (citing an example of a
county trying to increase transit ridership by stimulating multifamily housing near
transit stations during a discussion of transit-oriented zoning).
135. See Annie Lowrey, With Rental Demand Soaring, Poor Are Feeling
Squeezed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/business/
economy/the-poor-are-squeezed-as-rental-housing-demand-soars.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
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of multi-family starts in 1985.136 As a result, between 2006 and 2012,
the supply of multi-family units increased by 1.6 million, while the
number of renters increased by over 5 million.137 In addition, 1.9
million rental units were demolished between 2001 and 2011.138 As a
result of these trends, the national rental vacancy rate (8.3%) is at its
lowest point since 2000.139
As a result of this shortage, rents have increased throughout the
United States. Between 2000 and 2014, median household income
has increased by 25.4%, while rent has increased by 52.8%.140
Nationally, the percentage of renters paying more than 30% of their
income for housing jumped from 38% in 2000 to 50% in 2010.141
Twenty-eight percent of renters (including 69% of renters earning
under $15,000) now pay more than half their incomes in rent.142 The
explosion in rental costs has not been limited to traditionally highcost cities. For example, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, rents increased
from 20% of household income in 1979 to 35.2% in 2013.143
If homeowners are allowed to use nuisance law to limit multifamily housing, the shortage of rental housing is likely to get worse. If
would-be landlords can only build in places far from single-family
homes, the supply of land available for multi-family housing will
decrease, the number of new units will decrease, and rents will
continue to rise even more than would otherwise be the case. This is
the case because of the law of supply and demand: if the supply of a
commodity is limited, and demand is unchanged, people will bid up
the price for that commodity.144

136. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 34 (2014), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/sonhr14-color-full.pdf.
137. Id. at 25. However, about three million single-family homes were rented out.

Id.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id. at 22–23.
140. See Krishna Rao, The Rent is Too Damn High, ZILLOW REAL EST. RES. (Apr.
15, 2014), http://www.zillow.com/research/rent-affordability-2013q4-6681.
141. See Lowrey, supra note 135.
142. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 136, at 5.
143. See Rao, supra note 140.
144. Cf. Homeowner’s Corp. of River Trails v. Saba, 626 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that where there is “a housing shortage . . . the economic law
of supply and demand result[s] in unusually high housing prices”); Autumn Corp. v.
Lederman, 95 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (asserting that the “lack of
necessary business rental space due to the last war” led to “the exaction of
exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable rents”).
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In fact, the logic of Loughhead may limit rental housing even in
areas far away from single-family housing. If any increase in
population means increased traffic, and increased traffic means
nuisance, then in theory persons other than homeowners might be
able to assert nuisance claims against builders of new housing. For
example, the owner of an office park could argue that nearby housing
might clog traffic and thus unreasonably interfere with the commutes
of its employees and customers.
In sum, the national shortage of rental housing means that now,
more than ever, a neighborhood’s phobias should not be used to limit
the supply of such housing.
C.

Zoning Is a Less Harmful Remedy Than Nuisance

One purpose of zoning is to allow a municipality to create an
orderly plan of development for the benefit of the entire city, as
opposed to just one landowner or group of landowners.145 So where a
city or neighborhood is divided over a proposed land use, the city can
hold hearings and listen to a variety of perspectives, rather than just
those of one neighbor.
By contrast, in a lawsuit the court will primarily hear the
perspectives of the plaintiff and the defendant, rather than those of
the community as a whole. Thus, the court might give undue weight
to the perspectives of one or two people. So if nuisance suits become
more common in disputes relating to multi-family housing, a city’s
land use map might be determined not by citywide (or even
neighborhood-wide) give-and-take, but by the most successful
litigant—thus substituting rule by the angriest litigant for rule by the
majority of voters. Even if nuisance suits do not make development
impossible, they would make new construction burdensome by
forcing would-be builders to face two hurdles (zoning and a lawsuit)
where today one hurdle (zoning) is currently the norm. Thus, courts
should not allow one or two angry homeowners to use nuisance suits
to preempt zoning codes and other municipal plans.
IV. A PROPOSED RULE
For the reasons stated above, courts should not treat new infill
housing as a nuisance. But what rule should they adopt? One

145. See Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 586 P.2d 860, 866 (Wash. 1978)
(“[T]he purpose of zoning is not to increase or decrease the value of any Particular
lot or tract. Rather it is to benefit the Community generally by the intelligent
planning of land uses . . . [and to] promote orderly growth and development.”)
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possible rule might be: “housing should never be a nuisance.” But
this rule is overly simplistic, because even though new housing is not
generally a nuisance, certain features of a building could create a
nuisance. For example, a building could have an unusually noisy air
conditioning system,146 or some other rare feature that harms nearby
landowners.
A more precise rule would be that infill housing is not a nuisance
where the plaintiffs’ arguments are limited to concerns about traffic
congestion, neighborhood character, or other concerns that have no
logical stopping point. Thus, courts should reject nuisance claims
where the plaintiffs’ major concern is that the housing is denser than
nearby tracts of land or would allegedly increase congestion by
bringing additional people into the neighborhood. This rule would
apply the public policies in favor of new housing and compact
development, yet still leave open the possibility that a building or
subdivision may have unique features that create negative
externalities.147
A nuisance plaintiff might argue that, just as many courts balance
interests in other nuisance cases,148 courts should decide infill-related
nuisance suits by balancing the disruption caused by new housing
against the social benefits of new housing.149 However, courts should
reject this theory for two reasons. First, in cities with zoning, such
balancing may already be performed by zoning boards and city
councils, as well as by judges overhearing appeals from zoning
decisions.150 Thus, there is no need for judges to duplicate this
balancing by adjudicating separate nuisance suits. Second, an
additional layer of balancing would make the fate of any new
residential development even more unpredictable, and would thus

146. See, e.g., Nair v. Thaw, 242 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1968) (holding that a house’s air
conditioning system was a nuisance).
147. By analogy, I suspect that this rule could reasonably be applied to all nuisance
arguments that, like concerns over traffic congestion, might be applicable to all new
housing. But rather than set out a general rule that might be overbroad, courts or
legislatures might wish to decide on a case-by-case basis which arguments are
similarly meritless.
148. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
149. Alternatively, a plaintiff might argue that, like the Loughhead court, courts
should allow nuisance claims in such situations, but grant damages (rather than an
injunction) against allegedly objectionable residential development. See supra note
30 and accompanying text. But even the threat of damages liability might chill infill
development, and thus reduce infill housing supply—albeit to a lesser extent than
injunctions which absolutely shut down such projects.
150. See supra Part III.C (explaining why nuisance suits should not replicate the
zoning process).
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reduce the overall supply of infill housing—which (as explained
above) would mean that fewer people could live in older
neighborhoods, which in turn means more people driving more cars,
more danger to citizens from car crashes, pollution, and greenhouse
gas emissions, and more expensive housing. These results are a high
price to pay for the flexibility of a balancing test.
CONCLUSION
The Loughhead plaintiffs argued that a large multi-family building
in an area dominated by single-family homes was a nuisance, in part
because the building generates traffic and differs from the other
buildings in the neighborhood. This argument, if consistently
accepted by courts, would mean that any building or subdivision that
adds a significant amount of housing to a neighborhood is a nuisance,
because any new residents are likely to generate traffic, and any
increase in neighborhood population is likely to alter neighborhood
character in some way.
If courts frequently use nuisance law to limit infill development, a
variety of negative results would become more common. Because
infill development would be less frequent, developers would have to
build new housing in greenfield sites, often far from downtowns and
from public transportation. As a result, more people would be unable
to walk or use public transit to jobs and other destinations, causing
increased vehicle use and spending on vehicles, as well as additional
obesity, pollution, and deaths and injuries from automobile collisions.
Moreover, the resulting decrease in new housing construction could
raise rents and new home prices. Accordingly, courts should refuse to
allow nuisance suits against new housing, at least where such suits are
based on concerns generally applicable to new housing.

